Thursday, 18 September 2014

Can Farmers Really Participate in Futures Market?

Can Farmers Really Participate in Futures Market?

Risk and uncertainty are integral to the production environment of agriculture because the quality and the quantity of output that results from a given set of inputs are generally not known. Since agriculture is prone to events beyond the control of the farmers such as weather, insects and diseases the production or yield risk is high. Price uncertainty is also a normal feature of farming. Agricultural operations are biological in nature hence, there is a considerable time lag between sowing and harvest. However, production decisions have to be made well in advance of realizing the final product. Market prices are not known at the time these decisions have to be made. The consequence of incorrect anticipation can be potentially ruinous to the farmer.

Some risk management strategies such as crop diversification reduce the risk with in the farm’s operation. Crop insurance scheme is one way to protect against production loses. Contract farming offers the opportunity for the farmers to transfer the market risk or price risk to the buyer. Risk management is not a matter of minimizing risk but of determining how much risk a farmer can take given the alternatives and preferable tradeoffs. Mnimum Support Price (MSP) programme by the government is one of the ways by which Indian farmers are protected against market volatility. However, price support programme is only available for major crops not all crops are covered

Future trading is another way through which farmers can have insulation against price volatility. It is an institutional mechanism to trade risk. A primary use of futures contract involves shifting risk say, from a farmer who desires less risk (the hedger) to a party who is willing to accept the risk in exchange for an expected profit. However, it is not easy for the farmer leave alone the Indian farmer to participate in the future trading given the knowledge, infrastructure and the size specifications in the contract.

Future Contract
A future contract is an agreement priced and entered on an exchange to trade at a specified future time a commodity or other asset with specified attributes. To make trading possible the exchange specifies certain standardized features they include the quantity to be delivered, delivery month, delivery location, acceptable quality or grades of the commodity. It is important that future contracts are standardized because it enables the traders to focus on one variable namely price.  Standardization makes it possible for traders anywhere to trade in these markets and know exactly what they are trading.

There are a number of ways future contracts can be used in marketing agricultural commodities. Future contracts can be a temporary substitute for an intended transaction in the cash market that will occur at a later date. This is called hedging. Hedging is buying and selling futures contracts as a protection against unfavourable price changes. A short or selling hedge is used when the farmer plans to sell a commodity at some future date that is the farmer is concerned that the price may fall at that time in the spot market.  A long or buying hedge is used when the farmer plan to buy a commodity at a future date as he expects the price might increase at that date in the spot market.

Future trading
We will try to understand the mechanics of hedging by an example of a hypothetical farmer in Punjab growing potato and trading it on the Multi Commodity Exchange of India (MCX) platform. The farmer can sell a potato future contract on the MCX platform for delivery of a standard quality and quantity of potatoes in the month they would be sent to the market, if the crop is sown in October the farmer can sell them for a price that would be prevailing at the time of harvest i.e. in the month of February. If after having sold a futures contract potato prices fall on the physical market below the level at which he sold on the futures he can either deliver the potato against his contract or because the contract is standardized close out his position by buying out an equal number of futures contracts. The prices of futures contract might have fallen as the physical prices decline to reflect the value of potatoes delivered to the market. The difference between the price at which he sold and the price at which he purchased is the benefit the farmer got by trading in the futures.

Suppose our farmer in Punjab plants 5 acres of potatoes in October with an expected production of 30 metric tonnes. At the time the February price of potato the farmer guesses would be say Rs 350 per quintal. The farmer feels that he can earn a reasonable profit at that price. Since farmers have no control over price, by sowing potato the farmer is essentially betting that the price of potato will not decrease between the planting and harvest time. He can hedge this bet by selling in the futures at the current futures price quoted which is Rs 350 per quintal. Since the contract specification at MCX is for 30 MT and the farmer expected a production of 30 MT from his 5 acres he would sell one future contract.

The initial margin for a hedger and the maintenance margin on the contract are 6 percent as per the contract. The farmer would need to deposit at least Rs 6300 with a clearing organization to cover the margin for the contract sold. Everyday the contact would be marked to the market that is if the market moves in farmer’s favour (future prices declines) on a particular day the farmer’s margin account would be credited with the accrued profit of that day. On the other hand, if the future price rises the margin would be debited with the accrued losses. In case at any time the margin account falls below Rs 6300 the farmer would be required to deposit additional amount to bring back the account to Rs 6300. This process goes on let us say till the crop is harvested. The farmer got 30 MT he expected and the crop in general had been good as it is a normal year (that is other potato farmers also got good yield) hence the price had declined to say Rs 300 per quintal. The farmer has 30 MT of potatoes with him and he has sold 30 MT at the futures market. Now the farmer can unwind his position in two ways. One is to make delivery as per the terms of contract. In this case delivery location is the cold storages in Agra. This means the farmer has to incur transportation cost from his village in Punjab to Agra. This would be prohibitively costly.

However, most of the futures contracts are liquidated by squaring off the position rather than delivery as the mechanism to deliver may be inconvenient to the farmer. The farmer in our example can take an equal and opposite position in the futures market by buying one contract at the current price of Rs 300 per quintal. The farmer’s margin account increased by Rs 15,000 (Rs 50 per quintal x 300quital or 30 MT). The future trade has given the farmer a profit of Rs 50 per quintal. The farmer can sell the potato he has harvested at the nearby mandi at the spot price of Rs 300 per quintal. Considering that the farmer had received Rs 350 per quintal in the futures market even though he sold the potato for Rs 300 per quintal in the spot market he had effectively received Rs 350 per quintal for his crop.  

On the other hand, if the price of potato rises to Rs 400 per quintal the farmer will lose Rs 50 per quintal on the future but will be able to sell the potato at Rs 400 per quintal in the spot market. Thus the effective price he receives would be Rs 350 per quintal. This does not mean the hedge was not successful. Sometime the price goes up and sometimes down with hedging, however, farmer will be at least aware of his returns despite the volatility in price.
    
Farmers and Future Trading
Theoretically it is possible as described above for the farmer to hedge against price risk using futures contract. However, farmers’ participation in futures market even in advanced economies is low. This is mainly because of “lack of know how, lack of collateral for margins, small scale of operations and too cumbersome to execute, monitor and administer hedging transactions by small producers” Let us examine the factors that hinder the farmers in participating in the future trading.

Membership Fee
To participate in future trading it is necessary that one become the member of the commodity exchanges or trade through members. The cost to become a member is very very high (Table 1).  The admission fee alone in MCX is Rs 5 lakhs and 10 lakhs for the two categories of members whereas it is Rs 15 and 25 lakhs in NCDEX. Besides, there are annual fee, maintenance charges, VSAT cost etc, Therefore, farmer had to go through the firms or individuals who are already members to take part in the trade. This involves commission to be paid to the firm. The larger the traded volume the commission would be proportionately lower but in case of the farmer who is not a speculator the trading volume would be low dictated by his land size and expected yield. Therefore, the cost would be high for him.

Marked to Market Margin
Commodity exchanges require its members to deposit and maintain in their accounts a certain minimum amount of funds for each open position held. These funds are known as margin and represent a good faith deposit that strives to provide protection against losses in the market. The clearing house collects margins directly from the members of the exchange who in turn are responsible for the collection of funds from their clients. Therefore, the farmer had to maintain a deposit of the amount as specified in the contract with his firm for each of his position. As the margin is marked to the market that is daily fluctuation in the price is calculated and adjusted to the account the farmer had to deposit additional money whenever such situation arises.

Technology
The commodity is traded on line so there are a large number of buyers and sellers (sort of perfect competition) and no individual influences the price. This helps in correct price discovery -- one of the major roles of the commodity exchanges. For the farmer to track the prices and take part in trading he must not only have some preliminary understanding of the computers and internet but also have access to them nearby his village. No need to emphasis the point on computer literacy and rural connectivity to highlight the handicap farmers faces to really participate in trading in futures market.

Lot Size and Delivery
The exchange specifies the lot size for each contract for different commodities (Table 2).  If the farmer is not delivering the commodity at the end of the contract period but decides to square off the position as the potato farmer in our example lot size may not be an issue for the farmer. However, in case the farmer decides to deliver, say a potato farmer near Agra takes a futures contract to hedge against the risk and at the end of the contract period he may wish to deliver at the designated cold storage then lot size is going to be a deterrent for the farmer to participate in the trade. In case, crop production is affected due the vagaries of the weather, pest or disease and is lost the farmer had to buy the crop and deliver it to the designated cold storage. The contract also specifies the quality of the commodity to be delivered therefore it is the responsibility of the farmer to ensure the quality of his crop to meet the specification mentioned in the contract. There are costs involved for assaying the quality which has to be borne by the farmer.

 Role for an Aggregator
In order for future trading to be really used as a risk management tool for the benefit of the farmers it is often suggested to have an aggregator. These aggregators can pool the requirement of the farmers and canalize them in exchange platform. For this the aggregator has to be a neutral player who does not have any trading interest but earns a fee from such transactions. It could be a producer’s cooperative, an NGO or farmers’ association. The key issue in making available hedging instrument to farmers especially small farmers would necessarily mean building institutions that will allow retailing of risk management instruments to them. In other words, there needs to be institutional arrangements so a large entity can pool risk from many small farmers and hedge them. The Task Force on Plantations in its submitted report to the Government of India recommended forming of cooperatives by small growers to trade in futures. The proposed system would allow the aggregation of price risks of these producers.

Constraints for an Aggregator
Though there is role for an aggregator there may be several constraints that might confront it to effectively pool the requirements of the farmers and manage the risk at the exchange platform. Let us take a scenario where 25 farmers with an average holding of 6 acres coming together to form a cooperative or association to act as an aggregator for the purpose of hedging against price risk  Let us assume the farmers are taking two crops in a year- basmati rice and potato. The production is say 105 tonnes of basmati rice with the yield of 7 quintals per acre and 900 tonnes of potato with a yield of 6 quintals per acre from the 150 acres owned by the farmer members. The cooperative must first open a trading account with a firm (brokerage) having a membership in the exchange, as is evident from Table 1 it would be very costly even for a cooperative.  The lot size of the futures in rice is 10 MT per contract. The cooperative can enter into future for 10 contracts of rice and assuming that the price is Rs 1200 per quintal the value for 100 tonnes is Rs 12,00,000 at 8 percent initial margin (as per the contract specification of the exchange)  the cooperative need to deposit Rs 96,000 with the firm. The expected production of potato from the 150 acres of the members is 900 tonnes. The cooperative can trade in 30 contracts at the rate of 30 MT per contract. Assuming a price of Rs 350 per quintal the 30 contracts value would be Rs 31, 50,000 and the cooperative at 6 percent initial margin needs to deposit Rs 1, 89,000 with the firm. For the two crops the initial margin worked out to be Rs 2, 85,000 and for each farmer it is Rs 11,400. This seems to be a reasonable amount. As the cooperative also need to maintain the marked to market margin farmers must be in a position to pay the additional sum required as and when required.

The co-operative need to invest in infrastructure facilities such as computer with VSAT connection with UPS power back up to operate in the village. This is technically feasible as demonstrated by the ITC’s e choupal initiative. However, considering the size of the farm and the volume traded it may not be financially viable for the members to invest on the facility.

Before trading at the beginning of each crop season the members should work out the cost of cultivation and arrive at a consensus on the expected returns to enable the cooperative to lock in on an agreed price in the future. In case the price falls in the spot market member farmers would be happy. The cooperative would buy equal number of contracts to close or square off the position. The accrued differential that is between the spot price and the futures is credited to the cooperatives trading account. The cooperative then distributes the amount in proportion to the land holding and yield. The farmers sell their harvest in the spot market at the declined price but as they got the accrued amount from the cooperative due to the hedging operation they would be getting effectively the original price at which they agreed to lock in. In case the price rises in the spot market and the society by buying squares off the position, now the resultant loss should be paid by the cooperative and the farmers are expected to pay in proportion to their land holding and yield. Let us take the example of potato we used for the single farmer. If the locked in price is Rs 350 per quintal and the current price is Rs 400. The society by squaring off incurs a loss of Rs 50 per quintal and had to pay the exchange Rs 4,50,000. The member farmers sell their potato at Rs 400 per quintal and are expected to pay the society Rs 50 per quintal to pay off the exchange. This is difficult to achieve as members may not pay the society. They may under state the yield to pay less to the society and over state the yield if they had to get the accrued benefits of hedging. With the kind of cooperative spirit and few success stories it would not be pragmatic to think cooperatives or farmer’s association can successfully play the role of an aggregator for a long period on a sustainable basis.  “Hedgers must have a mindset that says I got what I expected therefore I am satisfied even when they could have done better without hedging or a fellow farmer gets a better price.” It would be hard to expect an individual farmer in a cooperative setting to have such a mind set.

In case the cooperative follows the delivery model the quality specification as defined in the contract would be difficult to maintain across the 25 farmers. Further, apportioning the cost of assaying that is quality test among the members in proportion to their land holding or yield would not be easy. Objectively maintaining quality and rewarding the member had been a major weakness of the producers’ cooperatives in India. If the lot is rejected on quality grounds the member may accuse the cooperative of bias. Further, it would be difficult for the cooperative to ensure the lot size if the farmer is not replacing his rejected lot by purchasing from outside or paying the cooperative to make good the shortfall from other sources. Similar situation might arise when there is a crop failure as the member farmer had to arrange for the crop with the quality specification mentioned in the contract to enable the society to fulfill its obligation with the exchange.

To sum up, it is theoretically possible for the farmer to manage price risk through future trading. However, in practice farmers even in advanced countries are not using futures to hedge against risk. In India apart from lack of technical knowhow, small size of holdings resulting in high transaction cost dissuade the farmers to trade in futures. The suggestion to have an aggregator who can pool the requirements of the farmers and trade in the exchange platform though seems an attractive proposition has its own set of constraints.  At best futures market may be helpful to farmers indirectly by way of better price discovery rather than for risk management.

Table 1 Membership Fee in the Two Major Commodity Exchanges (Amount in Rupees)

Deatails
MCX*
NCDEX
Trading cum clearing member (deposit based)
Institution Clearing Member
Trading  cum clearing member
Professional Clearing Membership
Admission Fee
5,00,000
10,00,000
15,00,000
25,00,000
Interest Free Security Deposit
50,00,000
50,00,000
15,00,000
25,00,000
Processing Fee
10,000
10,000
5,00,000

Annual Subscription
50,000
50,000
--
1,00,000
Annual insurance fee
5,600
5,600
--
--
VSAT cost
1,65,000
1,65,000
--
--
Advance maintenance charges
--
--
50,000
1,00,000
Net worth requirement
--
--
5,00,00,000
5,00,00,000
* MCX has another category called trading cum clearing member (non deposit based) where the admission fee is 10 lakhs and the security deposit is 15lakhs





Saturday, 6 September 2014

A Critical Look at the Terminal Market Concept for Perishables

A Critical Look at the Terminal Market Concept for Perishables

The agricultural marketing system is a link between the farm and nonfarm sectors. The biological nature of the agricultural commodities and small farm nature of agriculture in the country had made the farmers price takers with little influence over the market price. APMC act in almost states were amended to include provision of direct marketing and contract farming, development of agricultural markets in private and cooperative sector.

With the increasing income there has been a considerable shift in favour of fresh fruits, vegetables, animal protein, milk etc in the Indian consumer basket. On the other hand, the organized retail is growing with the emphasis on cost reduction through supply chain efficiency. The existing supply chain for agricultural commodities is long and fragmented resulting in considerable wastages especially for fruits and vegetables. Hence the system was neither able to pass a fair share of consumer rupee to the producer nor was able to benefit the consumer with lower prices. With the launch of the National Horticultural Mission in 2005-06 it was expected that there would be a manifold increase in production of fruits and vegetables. The expected increase in production could be sustained only when there is adequate infrastructure to handle post harvest management and marketing of these crops. With this background, the scheme of terminal market complex was conceptualized and being implemented.

The terminal market would operate in a hub and spoke model. The terminal market would be the hub linked to a number of collection centres called spokes. With the amendment of the APMC act greater private sector involvement was expected in setting up the terminal market complex.  

Terminal Market
The terminal market with ultra modern facilities would be located near major urban centres in the country. These markets would be serviced by a number of collection centres (spokes) established in key production areas. The collection centres would get the supply from individual farmers or farmers association at the village or block level. The farmers or their association can bypass the collection centres and supply directly to the terminal markets.

The market complex would contain all the necessary infrastructure. The electronic auctioning platform would help in quick, efficient and transparent process of the transactions. The processor, exporter, wholesaler, trader, retail chain can all be members of the exchange and participate in the auctioning. There are provisions for cold storage, warehouse facilities, ripening chambers at the complex. Necessary infrastructure for cleaning, grading, packing, pellatisation, quality testing etc would be part of the complex. The participants can avail these services on payment of user charges.  Besides, facilities for banking and transport etc would be provided. In short, all facilities for smooth transactions and better price realization would be created under one roof.

Collection Centres
The collection centres would be located at key production areas. The major function of the centre would be to aggregate the produce received from the registered farmers or their association and sent them to the terminal markets. These commodities would be washed, graded and sorted before sent to the terminal markets. These centres would receive the payment from the terminal market and settle it with the suppliers. The centres would collect and disseminate information on prices, quality requirement etc to the growers. There would be advisory services on agronomic practices such as inputs, their dosages etc.

Thus, the collection centres in production areas will integrate producers and retailers, processing units and exporters etc. into market system. The number of collection centres shall be determined in each case depending on the size of the market, distance from growing areas and other factors.

Functioning of the Terminal Markets
The commodities to be marketed by the TMC will include all perishables, inter-alia, fruits, vegetables, flowers, spices, aromatics, herbs, medicinal plants, meat products, poultry products, dairy products and fish and marine products etc. Non-perishables can also be handled in the TMC. However, the annual throughput for perishable horticultural produce such as fruits, vegetables, flowers, medicinal plants, aromatics, herbs etc handled by each TMC should not be less than 70% of the throughput capacity of the TMC.

The individual farmer or producer association brings the produce from the farms and villages. At the collection centres the commodities are washed, cleaned and graded. Poor quality is rejected and those which meet the quality specifications are made into a lot and sent to the terminal markets. The supplies coming from the collection centres are auctioned through the electronic trading platform. Since, the farmers are expected to get a fair return a floor price is fixed for the commodity below which the goods will not be sold. The unsold stock may be taken to the cold storages to be auctioned on a subsequent day. The payment from the successful bidder is collected on the same day and the stocks transferred to him. The purchaser may transfer the goods to some place outside the market complex or use the facilities at the market to store or further process the commodities. Only registered buyers are allowed to participate in the auction.  

In case the purchaser bids for smaller quantity in the lot, the lot will be broken and the remaining quantity would be auctioned again. In case of unsold stocks the terminal market through its forward linkages with institutional buyers or through its retail outlets would dispose off the commodity. For example the project report for the Chandigarh complex envisages apart from linkages with institutions like Army, Paramilitary, eating establishments it was expected that ten retail outlets would be opened in different parts of the country by the market operator to dispatch the produce.

Eight terminal market complexes for perishables at Nagpur, Nashik, Bhopal, Kolkata, Patna, Rai, Chandigarh and Mumbai were to be established. Although the detailed project report has been prepared for several terminal markets such as Chandigarh, Mumbai, Sambalpur, Ahmedabad, Surat etc by National Institute of Agricultural Marketing and other consultants the response for the bid was lukewarm. The government is considering increasing the subsidy component[1] to make the idea more attractive to the private players. There could be several reasons for low response to the concept. Some of the reasons could be flaws in the very design some of which we try to highlight below.

 
Issues in the Conception of TM
A market can be defined as a place where buyers and sellers meet in order to exchange products and values with others.  It is a place where the needs and wants of the consumer is expected to be met. However, the terminal market apart from providing a place and facilities for buyers and sellers to interact is also obliged to create forward linkages with the institutional buyers as well as set up own retail outlets. That is it is expected that the market operators also would indulge in buying and selling the commodities. There is no reason why a market operator would involve himself in trading activity. His primary aim would be to look for a fair return on his investment by providing the services or facilities in the complex rather than take additional risk of buying and onward marketing of the commodities.

For example, the project report on Chandigarh terminal market envisages setting up “Forward Link Team” which will find the daily prevailing rate in all important markets of India and find out the possibility of dispatching the produce. Further, the report expected the TMC to open retail outlets at Chandigarh and other parts of the country to sell the commodities coming to terminal markets. Further, an ambitious idea was proposed that is, to brand the commodities passing though the Chandigarh terminal.

So, it is clear that terminal markets are expected not merely to provide a platform but indulge in buying and selling of the commodities. This is unlikely because the buyers take part in market transaction to fulfill their particular need or want in exchange for some value terminal market operators are not in a position to do unless some promoters also have interest in organized retail, processing or export. Even then, it is unfair to expect that they will be able to clear whatever arrives in the market.

At the time of auctioning a floor price is fixed for the commodity. If the auction price is below the floor price the commodity will not be sold. The floor price is fixed in order to ensure a fair return to the farmers. In case, if the commodity is not sold what happens? If it is kept in cold storage for some time for the price to rise who will bear the cost?  If there is bumper harvest depressing the prices will the floor price be revised to the level which may not be remunerative to the farmer? Ideally market forces must be allowed to operate and the goods need to be cleared unless the specific producer or association request that the commodity should not be sold below a certain price and willing to hold in the cold storage at its own cost. The terminal markets operators should be kept away from such responsibilities.

At the collection centre the supply comes from different individual farmers from many villages either brought by the farmer himself or by the producer association. The commodities are graded and sorted since much of the quality parameters for fruits and vegetables are subjective it would not be possible to convince a farmer that his produce is second grade. The problem would be compounded if the price difference between the two grades is high or when the produce just marginally fails to make the higher grade. There will be accusation of bias, nepotism etc against the centres’ office bearers. Such situation had lead to collapse of many collective efforts in the country. This may well prove an Achilles heel in the terminal market in forming groups or association of farmers to ensure supply.

In the normal traditional market the farmer’s lot receive an average price irrespective of the percentage of different grades in the lot. Nothing is returned to him. In case of terminal market concept, at the collection centres after grading the residual is expected to be taken back by the farmer. Apart from the cost of transport the farmer has to find alternative ways to dispose of these residuals. Because of such hassles, farmers would prefer the traditional market to terminal markets.

Farmers in most part of the country sell the perishables especially fruits through forward contracts. That is just a month before harvest contractors take the orchards or plantation for a fixed amount. The farmer is not only saved from price volatility but also in having to arrange for labour to harvest small quantities and arrange for transport. As the harvesting season extends to a month or couple of months it makes eminent sense for the farmer to have such arrangements. It is therefore, not reasonable to expect them to form groups or associations and bring the produce to the market.

Further, the lots coming from the collection centres would be bigger. In case a bidder bids for a part of the lot it needs to be broken and the rest would be auctioned again. In case there are three different price realizations for the same lot how that would be distributed to the farmers. Will the realization would be pooled and divided proportionately according to the supply of a farmer or would they be treated separately. What would be the reaction of the farmers?

The farmers are expected to be paid immediately upon selling of his produce. The bidder is to deposit the amount immediately on purchase of the commodity. What would be the arrangement to transfer and how long that would take is not clear. However, it was mentioned in the guidelines to create a revolving fund to expedite the payment process. The question is who will contribute to this and why the operator of the market should take this additional responsibility.

The terminal market operator is responsible for establishing the collection centres that is identifying the location and getting the necessary clearances. They are to offer 26 percent stake in the terminal market to these collection centres. This is with the intention that the collection centre would continue to supply on a sustained basis if their interest is involved. Each terminal market would require substantial investment may be ranging from rupees 50 crore to 100 crores. Twenty six percent of this would be a huge amount to be raised from the farmer members at the collection centres. With no direct return at least in the initial years it would be a herculean task to mobilize the amount from the farmers.

These markets are to be located near major urban centres and a large area of prime land is to be allotted to the project. It would be tantalizing for the promoters to use major portion of the land for commercial establishment and less to marketing agricultural products. If proper mechanism is not put in place such a misuse cannot be prevented.

Therefore, more clarity is needed in various aspects of the proposed terminal market idea. The role of the promoter has to be made realistic in order to make the proposition attractive to the private investors.